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PROTECTING RELIANCE ON THE PATENT SYSTEM:
THE ECONOMICS AND EQUITIES
OF INTERVENING RIGHTS
Assume that a patent has been issued for a machine and
that thereafter someone produces or otherwise acquires a
machine of the same character but which does not infringe
any of the claims of the patent. Thereafter the patentee
obtains a reissue of his patent, and the reissued patent
contains claims which would be infringed by the use or
sale of the machine produced by the other person, or by
the construction of others just like it. What are the respec-
tive rights of the parties?
P.J. Federico'
INTRODUCTION
To fulfill its goal of "promot[ing] the progress of science and
the useful arts,"2 the United States government grants inventors
patents. A patent gives "the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention" covered by the
patent.3 Patents are published and collected, giving notice to the
public of activities that can and cannot be undertaken without
infringing the property rights of another.
Unfortunately, reliance on the patent system is not always well
placed. Errors occur in patents, and their correction by reissue of
patents (and other means) is allowed in the interest of protecting
the patentee from inequitably forfeiting rights.4 However, these
1. PJ. Federico, Intervening Rights in Pateni Reissues, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 603,
604 (1962).
2. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994).
4. See Arnold B. Silverman, To Err is Human-Patent Reissues and the Doctrine of
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corrections can cause hardship to third parties who have relied
upon the erroneous original patent.5 As a consequence, when pat-
ents are corrected through the reissue process third parties are
sometimes afforded legal and equitable protections known as "inter-
vening rights,"6 which can include the right to infringe the correct-
ed patent.7
Although originally applicable only to correction of patents,
intervening rights have expanded in scope. They have been autho-
rized where patents have been reinstated after having lapsed for
failure to pay a maintenance fee.' They have also been a part of
changes to the patent laws9 and extensions of the terms of classes
Intervening Rights, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 696, 696 (1966).
5. See id.
6. The term "intervening rights" has its basis in the fact that originally such rights
intervened to make a reissued patent unenforceable. See McArthur v. Brooklyn Ry. Supply
Co., 19 F. 263, 264 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884) (allowing enforcement of a reissued patent be-
cause, inter alia, "no rights of others are shown to have intervened"). Prior to the use of
the term with regard to reissues, it was used in the context of abandonment of the right
to obtain a patent. See, e.g., Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 6 F. Cas. 353, 356
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 3135), aff d, 94 U.S. 92 (1877).
7. See 35 U.S.C. § 252 para. 2.
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(2). The intervening rights provided in § 41(c)(2) are similar
to those provided when patents are reissued. See H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 8 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 772.
A 1946 law authorized the Commissioner of Patents to accept late payment of fees
on patents that "lapsed because of conditions growing out of World War ]I," thereby
reviving such patents. Boykin Act, ch. 910, § 3, 60 Stat. 940, 942 (1946). Intervening
rights were provided to protect the rights of those who had acted prior to the revival, to
continue otherwise infringing actions. See id. § 4, 60 Stat. at 942-43. Similar provisions
for acceptance of late fees and intervening rights were also enacted because of the hard-
ships caused to foreign patentees by World War L See Act of March 3, 1921, ch. 126,
§§ 2-3, 41 Stat. 1313, 1314 (1921).
9. As part of the 1995 change of the patent term from 17 years from the grant of
the patent to 20 years from the filing of the patent, the term of some patents already in
force was extended. See Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532(a),
108 Stat 4809, 4984-85 (1994) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1)). However, rights to
continue activities that would otherwise constitute infringement were provided to those
whose activities became infringing because of the extension, conditioned upon "payment of
an equitable remuneration to the patentee." 108 Stat. at 4985 (codified as 35 U.S.C. §
154(c)(2)-(3)). See generally Thomas L. Irving & Stacy D. Lewis, Proving a Date of
Invention and Infringement After GATTRIPS, 22 AIPLA QJ. 309, 355-65 (1994). These
provisions do not constitute a defense to infringement, but rather limit the remedies avail-
able to patentees. See, e.g., DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 62
F.3d 1397, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
A 1988 law prohibited importation of a product made by a patented process. See
Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 9003, 102 Stat.
1107, 1563-64 (1988) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)). This prohibition contained a
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of'o or specific1 expired patents. In addition, they have been in-
voked as a model for prior user rights, 2 as well as being a part
of proposed changes in the law governing patent extensions 3 and
the doctrine of equivalents. 4
"grandfather clause" which exempted commercial transactions "to the extent equitable for
the protection of .. . investments made or business commenced" before the effective date
of the law. Id., § 9006(b), 102 Stat. at 1567 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271 note). See
generally Robert R. Deveza, A Grandfather Clause, Due Process and the GATT, Whatever
Happened to the Grandfather Clause of the Process Patent Act of 1988?, 18 RuTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 65 (1992). This grandfather clause was modeled after the inter-
vening rights provision for reissues. See S. REP. No. 100-83, at 59 (1987).
In 1984 changes were made regarding the applicability of some prior art for purpos-
es of determining obviousness, and the treatment of inventions made by two or more
persons jointly. See Patent Law Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, §§ 103-104,
98 Stat 3383, 3384-85 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (prior art) and 35 U.S.C. §
116 (joint inventors)). Intervening rights were provided with respect to these changes for
infringers who had reasonably relied on the prior state of the law. See Id. § 106(d), 98
Stat. at 3385-86.
10. A 1950 law provided for extensions to patentees who were World War II veterans
and whose income from a patent was substantially reduced because of the war. See Veter-
ans Patent Extension Act, ch. 444, § 1, 64 Stat. 316, 316-17 (1950). Anyone who was
lawfully manufacturing prior to the passage of the act was given a right to continue or
resume such manufacturing, subject to the payment of a reasonable royalty to the paten-
tee. See id. § 4(c), 64 Stat. at 318.
A 1928 law provided for similar extensions to patentees who were World War I
veterans. See Act of May 31, 1928, ch. 992, § I(A)-(F), 45 Stat. 1012, 1012-13 (1928).
Intervening rights were provided to prior manufacturers, with no requirement for payment
of a royalty. See id. § 1(H), 45 Stat. at 1013.
11. See Patent & Trademark Office Authorization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-179, §
8, 107 Stat. 2040, 2042 (1993) (providing intervening rights for those prejudiced by legis-
lative renewal of three design patents belonging to the American Legion); Radio Position
Finding Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 205 F. Supp. 850, 853-55 (D. Md. 1962) (discussing
earlier cases involving intervening rights provisions for specific patents), affd, 371 U.S.
577 (1963).
12. See Robert L. Rohrback, Prior User Rights: Roses or Thorns?, 2 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. LJ. 1, 28-29 (1993); Keith M. Kupferschmid, Prior User Rights: The Inventor's
Lottery Ticket, 21 AIPLA QJ. 213, 226 (1993); Ridsdale Ellis, Subsequent Inventor's
Patent Rights With Regard to an Invention Previously Made by Another Who Kept It
Secret, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 259, 284-85 (1953). A prior user right is a defense to
infringement based on a third party's use of an invention before the filing of a patent on
iL See Kupferschmid, supra, at 216.
13. See H.R. 5475, 102d Cong. § 1(b)(4) (1992).
14. Under the doctrine of equivalents, an accused product that does not literally in-
fringe a patent may nonetheless be found to be equivalent to the claimed invention (and
thus infringing) if "it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain the same result." Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339
U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42
(1929)); see also Pennwat Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (in bane). The doctrine has spawned an enormous amount of litigation and com-
mentary. See, e.g., 4 DONALD S. CisuM, PATENTs § 18.04[1], at 18-96 n.21 (1996)
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Despite all the recent attention on expanding the reach of equi-
table intervening rights, they have seldom been granted in cases of
patent reissues, where the doctrine was developed. This Note pro-
poses a view of equitable intervening rights for reissued and reex-
amined' 5 patents based on actual, reasonable reliance by the inter-
venor on misleading statements contained in the claims of the
original patent. When a reissue narrows the scope of a patent,16
reliance on the scope of other valid claims of the original patent is
reasonable only where the original patent is so vague as to be
misleading as to the scope of the protection asserted. It is further
proposed that when reasonable reliance on a misleading statement
is demonstrated, courts should take strong action to protect the
(citing dozens of cases and articles on the doctrine in the wake of Pennwalt). The latest
word in the doctrine of equivalents is a recent Supreme Court decision, reversing a 1995
in banc decision by a sharply divided Federal Circuit. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997). The Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson up-
held the doctrine, but limited its scope to situations where equivalence is found for every
element of the claimed invention. See id. at 1054. It also announced a presumption that
amendments made during patent prosecution limit the scope of the equivalent elements.
See id.
It has been proposed that the doctrine of equivalents should be replaced by an ex-
panded availability of broadening reissues, with intervening rights used to protect third
parties. See Allan G. Altera, Expanding the Reissue Procedure: A Better Way to do Busi-
ness, 1 J. INTELL. PRop. L. 185 (1993); Martin J. Andelman & Gary L. Francione, The
Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 673, 726 (1989). In addition, one Federal Circuit judge called for tempering
the application of the doctrine by judicial establishment of "intervening rights similar to
those for claims changed on reissue." Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co.,
62 F.3d 1512, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc) (Nies, J., dissenting), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
1040 (1997). The possibility of applying intervening rights protection to the doctrine of
equivalents was addressed in the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in Warner-
Jenkinson. See Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae at 18,
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., (No. 95-728) (opposing application of
intervening rights); Brief of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Seagate Technology, Inc. at 24-
25, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., (No. 95-728) (favoring application).
The Supreme Court did not expressly address the issue, but dismissed the argument for
applicability of reissue limitations as having failed to command a majority in Graver
Tank. See Warner-Jenlanson, 117 S. Ct. at 1047 & n.3.
15. Patent reexamination is a procedure by which the Patent and Trademark Office
reviews an issued patent at the request of the patentee or a third party to see if it is
valid with respect to patents or printed publications that raise a substantial new question
of patentability. See infra Part I.B.2. Generally, the term "reissue," as used herein, encom-
passes revisions of patents from both the reissue and reexamination processes.
16. A narrowing of patent scope occurs when the original claims are limited in some
way, without also being changed to cover other activities that were not originally covered.
See infra note 47 (discussing reissues that broaden patent scope).
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rights of the intervenor, generally in the form of a compulsory
license of the patent.
Part I provides background on the patent system in general, the
means under it for correcting patents, and the history and current
status of intervening rights. Part II lays out the economic basis for
correction of patents and for intervening rights, and the characteris-
tics of an ideal intervening rights system. Part m outlines the
current proposal, and Part IV discusses potential areas of concern
with this proposal.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Patents, in General
The power to enact laws relating to patents is given to Con-
gress under the Constitution. 7 The patent law now in effect is the
result of a general revision enacted in 1952, and is codified in
Title 35 of the United States Code.' 8
Every patent application is required to contain a specifica-
tion,19 which "shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same."20
The specification must "conclude with one or more claims particu-
larly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter that the
applicant regards as his invention."' It is the claims of the issued
patent that define whether a thing or activity falls within the scope
of the patent.' A patentee whose patent is infringed is entitled to
remedy by civil action.' Relief may be granted in the form of an
17. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
18. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING
PATENTS 3 (1988); Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
19. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994).
20. § 112.
21. § 112.
22. See, e.g., Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. CI. 1967) ("It is
to [the claims] that one must look to determine whether there has been infringement.").
23. See § 281.
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award for damages,24 attorney fees,' and an injunction against
further infringement.
Patent applications are reviewed by the Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO"), which issues a patent if the invention satisfies the
criteria of patentability.' These criteria require an invention to be
"novel" and "non-obvious" with respect to the prior art.2 An in-
vention fails the novelty requirement if it has been known or used
in the United States, or patented or published in a foreign country,
before the date of invention 9 It also fails that requirement if it
has been patented or published anywhere more than a year prior to
its priority date.3° The invention fails the non-obviousness require-
ment "if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains."' There are also other bars to patentabili-
ty which are not germane to the present discussion.32 Besides be-
ing bars to issuance of a patent, the criteria of patentability can
also be used as a defense in an action involving the validity or
infringement of a patent 3
24. See § 284 (the damages can include interest and costs, and triple damages may be
awarded at the discretion of the court in cases of willful infringement).
25. See § 285.
26. See § 283.
27. See § 131.
28. Prior art consists of all the publicly available information in the field of the inven-
tion, including journal articles and textbooks, as well as the prior patents of the field. See
4 ERNEsT BAINBRIDGE LIBSCOMB III, WALKER ON PATENTS § 12:21 (3d ed. 1995).
29. See § 102(a).
30. See § 102(b). The priority date of a patent application is generally the date the
application is filed with the PTO. However, an application may be entitled to an earlier
priority date based on a prior foreign or international application for the same invention.
See §§ 119, 365. An application continued from an abandoned United States application
or part of an earlier United States application may also be entitled to the priority date of
the earlier application. See §§ 120, 121.
31. § 103(a).
32. Foremost among these are that the invention cannot have been in public use or for
sale in the United States for more than one year prior to the filing of the application, see
§ 102(b); that the inventor cannot have received a foreign patent prior to, nor filed an
application for such patent more than one year prior to, filing the United States applica-
tion, see § 102(d); and that the inventor generally must have been the first to discover
the invention in the United States, see § 102(e), (g).
33. See § 282.
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Since at the time of application for a patent there is necessarily
uncertainty as to the ultimate scope of a patent that will be al-
lowed by the FTO and upheld in an infringement action, a funda-
mental means of assuring a patent of adequate scope is to include
in the application a range of claims of varying scope.34 Each of
these claims is independently presumed valid.35
B. Amendment of Issued Patents
Recognizing that for one reason or another errors are bound to
find their way into issued patents, the patent laws set up four
methods of post-issuance revision of patents. Two of these meth-
ods, disclaimer 36 and issuance of a certificate of correction,37
have only minor impact on the rights of third parties3s and are
34. 2 IRVING KAYTON, PATENT PRACTICE 10.4 (6th ed. 1995).
35. See § 282.
36. See § 253. A disclaimer is used by the patentee to either withdraw invalid terms
of a patent (substantive disclaimer) or to dedicate to the public all or part of the remain-
ing term of a patent (terminal disclaimer). When some terms of a patent are known to be
invalid, a substantive disclaimer can open the way to recovery of costs by a patentee
prevailing in a subsequent infringement suit. See § 284 (interest and costs can be awarded
as part of the damages in an infringement suit); § 288 (patentee cannot recover costs
unless any invalid claim has been disclaimed prior to the commencement of the suit). A
terminal disclaimer can be used to set identical termination dates for all patents issuing to
the same inventor covering the same subject matter, thereby overcoming a double patent-
ing rejection. See 5 KAYTON, supra note 34, at 22.37.
37. Certificates of correction are used to correct errors of the PTO, see § 254, minor
errors such as typographical errors, see § 255, and errors in the naming of inventors, see
§ 256.
38. Disclaimers ordinarily relate back to the date on which the patent issued. See 5
KAYTON, supra note 34, at 22.34. But since in a disclaimer the patentee is disclaiming
part of the subject matter coverage or term of the patent, third parties will not normally
be prejudiced by this retroactivity.
Certificates of correction for PTO errors are "considered as part of the original pat-
ent." § 254. However, for all certificates correcting the body of the patent, the corrected
patent has "the same effect and operation in law on the trial of actions for causes there-
after arising as if [such patent] had been originally issued in such corrected form." §§
254, 255 (emphasis added). Thus, acts of infringement between the issuance of the patent
and the issuance of the certificate would appear to provide no basis for recovery. 5
KAYTON, supra note 34, at 22.28. This is analogous to the absolute intervening rights
provisions applying to reissued patents. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, certificates correcting a patentee's errors have been found to have retro-
active effect. See Eagle Iron Works v. McLanahan Corp., 429 F.2d 1375, 1383 (3d Cir.
1970); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Burndy Corp., Civ. A. No. 83-2990, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3219, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 1989). The generally minor nature of these correc-
tions means that third parties are not likely to be seriously prejudiced. See Eagle, 429
F.2d at 1384 & n.23. Therefore intervening rights may not be alleged with respect to
certificates correcting such minor errors. See id. at 1383. This result is analogous to the
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not considered further. On the other hand, the other two methods
of correction, reissue and reexamination, may substantially affect
the rights of third parties. Therefore, a brief explanation of these
methods is warranted.
1. Reissue
Reissues have been around almost as long as the United States
patent system, even before there was statutory authority to grant
them. 39 The present statute allows a patent to be reissued when
"through error without any deceptive intention" the patentee has
claimed "more or less than he had a right to claim in the pat-
ent." The reissue application must be filed by the inventor or
the owner of the patent4 and must include the usual elements of
a patent application.' In addition, it must include an oath attest-
ing to the patentee's belief that the patent is wholly or partially
inoperative due to error, and a statement specifying with particu-
larity the errors and how they occurred.43 The application "must
retroactivity provided for claims in a reissue that have not been substantially changed. See
infra note 57 and accompanying text.
However, the possibility of intervening rights for a certificate of correction has not
been completely foreclosed. A certificate of correction could be used to correct a signifi-
cant error, such as a printer's error omitting a claim added during prosecution of the
patent. See 5 KAYTON, supra note 34, at 22.10. Intervening rights could arise in such a
situation for an infringer who violated the omitted claim but not the other claims of the
patent. See id. at 22.28.
Another situation where intervening rights could arise is where a patentee's attorney
mistakenly disclaims the remainder of the patent term, and later uses a certificate of cor-
rection to rectify the error. In a malpractice action involving these facts, summary judg-
ment was sought by the patent attorney on the basis that the retroactive effect of the
certificate eliminated any possibility that intervening rights could have been acquired by
infringers. See Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Schwartz, 105 F.3d 863, 866 (3d Cir. 1997).
Summary judgment was granted by the District Court, but the grant was vacated on ap-
peal. See id. at 864. The intervening rights issue was characterized as involving "difficult
questions of first impression" that were better addressed in a pending infringement suit
involving the same patent. Id. at 867. The situation in Schwartz is analogous to that when
a patent is reinstated after having lapsed due to failure to pay a maintenance fee-a situa-
tion for which intervening rights are authorized. See § 41(c)(2).
39. See Federico, supra note 1, at 605.
40. § 251. In addition to correcting the claims, reissues can be filed to claim an earli-
er priority date based on a foreign application or a copending United States application,
to correct inaccuracies in the patent's disclosure, or to correct a misjoinder of inventors.
See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 1402 (6th ed., rev. 2 1996) [hereinafter MPEP].
41. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.172(a) (1996).
42. See § 1.171.
43. See § 1.175(a).
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[also] be accompanied by an offer to surrender the original pat-
ent." The reissue must be for the invention disclosed in the orig-
inal patent, and no new matter' may be introduced in a
reissue.46 Any application for a broadening reissue47 must be
made within two years of the issuance of the original patent.'
During review of the reissue examination "the entire application
[is] examined in the same manner as original applications,"'49 in-
cluding claims resubmitted from the original patent, which are not
subject to a presumption of validity. The reissue application is
generally examined by the same examiner who examined the origi-
nal application 5 ' Although the notice of the reissue application is
published in the PTO's Official Gazette 2 and interested parties
have an opportunity to submit to the examiner material pertinent to
the patentability of the reissue application,.3 the examination is
essentially ex parte.54 The applicant for a reissue has the same
rights to appeal as are available to an applicant for an original
patent.55
44. § 1.178.
45. "New matter" is a term of art. It refers to matter that in any way "modifies
(whether by addition, deletion, or change) the description of the invention, the teaching of
how to make or use the invention, or the disclosure of the best mode contemplated by
the inventor for carrying out the invention." 2 KAYTON, supra note 34, at 8.1. However,
"matter that makes explicit what was implicit, inherent, or intrinsic in the original disclo-
sure is not new matter." Id.
46. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994).
47. A broadening reissue "enlarg[es] the scope of the claims of the original patent." §
251. Reissue claims are broader if they cover any thing or activity not covered in the
original patent, even if the revised claims no longer cover other things or activities that
were covered in the original patent. See In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
48. See § 251.
49. 37 C.F.R. § 1.176.
50. See In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
51. See MPEP, supra note 40, § 1440.
52. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(b).
53. See MPEP, supra note 40, § 1441.
54. See Stephen C. Shear & William S. Galliani, Post Allowance and Post Issuance
Practice Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office as It Relates to Newly
Discovered Prior Art, in ELECrRONiC AND COMUTrER PATENT LAW 627, 669 (PLI Pat.,
Copy., Trademark, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 292, 1990).
55. See 5 KAYTON, supra note 34, at 22.96. A dissatisfied applicant may first appeal
to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, see 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1994), and from
there either to the Federal Circuit, see § 141, or the District Court for the District of
Columbia, see § 145.
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The surrender of the original patent takes effect upon reissue of
the patent. 6 The reissue is not retroactively effective, except for
claims that are substantively identical to those of the original pat-




Reexamination is a relatively recent addition to patent law,
having been introduced into the law in 1980.58 A request for re-
examination may be filed by "[a]ny person at any time" on the
basis of prior art patents or printed publications which have previ-
ously been cited in writing to the PTO.59 The PTO then deter-
mines "whether a substantial new question of patentability ... is
raised by the request." If such a question has been raised, the
patent is reexamined.6' However, the reexamination is generally
limited to questions of patentability on the basis of prior art patents
and publications.62  No broadening claims are permitted. 63 As in
the case of an application for reissue, the same examiner who
handled the original application will generally preside over the
reexamination,' and the procedure is largely ex parte, with the
56. See § 252.
57. § 252. The statute allows for the continuation of "identical" claims, but this has
been interpreted to mean claims "without substantive change." Kaufman Co. v. Lantech,
Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
58. See Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1994)).
59. §§ 301-302.
60. § 303(a).
61. See § 304. The requester may petition the Commissioner of Patents and Trade-
marks to reconsider an initial decision refusing reexamination. The Commissioner's deci-
sion on such a petition is final and nonappealable. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(c) (1996).
62. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.552. The examiner is not limited to the cited prior art, but can
conduct an independent search for other prior art. See MPEP, supra note 40, § 2257. In
addition, an admission by the patentee can be used in evaluating the scope and content of
the prior art. See Ex parte McGaughey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334, 1338 (PTO Bd. Pat.
App. & nt. 1988). There were several unsuccessful attempts in the 104th Congress to
widen the scope of prior art and patentability issues considered. See, e.g., H.R. 1732,
104th Cong. § 3(b) (1995).
63. See 35 U.S.C. § 305.
64. See MPEP, supra note 40, § 2236 ("Reexamination requests should normally be
assigned . . . to the primary examiner most familiar with the claimed subject matter of
the patent."); id. § 2255 ("The examination will ordinarily be conducted by the same
primary examiner .. . who made the decision on whether the reexamination request
should be granted."); see also Shear & Galliani, supra note 54, at 663 ("Generally, the
Examiner who acted on the issuing patent presides over the Reexamination procedure.").
However, if the order for reexamination results from an appeal to the Commissioner of
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non-patentee requester limited to its initial request and a single
reply to the patentee's initial response.65 The patentee has a right
to appeal an unsatisfactory reexamination outcome.6 The requester
has neither the right to appeal the outcome,67 nor the right to par-
ticipate in a patentee's appeal.68
C. Intervening Rights
1. A Brief History of Intervening Rights up to 195269
The doctrine of intervening rights has its roots in the late nine-
teenth century, when reissues were granted liberally and the propor-
tion of reissues to newly issued patents was over ten times what it
is under the present law.7" The judicial response to this profusion
of reissues, most of which were broadening and many of which
were attained years after the issue of the original patent, was a
doctrine of laches in applying for reissue, the effect of which when
invoked was to invalidate the reissue.71 A decade later it was stat-
ed that reissues would be invalidated not just for delay, but also
because of "circumstances... occurr[ing] since the granting of the
original patent which made the reissue operate harshly or unjustly"
against third parties.7' The concept that these "circumstances"
would operate to invalidate a broadening reissue eventually came to
be known as the doctrine of intervening rights.7' For narrowing
reissues, however, laches and intervening rights were generally
thought not to be applicable.74
Patents, the reexamination will ordinarily be conducted by another examiner. See 37
C.F.R. § 1.525(a).
65. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.535. A number of unsuccessful attempts were made in the
104th Congress to afford third parties greater opportunity to participate in reexamination
proceedings. See, e.g., H.R. 1732, 104th Cong. § 3(d) (1995).
66. See 35 U.S.C. § 306 (patentee has same appeal rights as in 35 U.S.C. §§ 134,
141-145).
67. See In re Opprecht, 868 F.2d 1264, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1989). A number of unsuc-
cessful attempts were made in the 104th Congress to give third-party requesters a right to
appeal the outcome of a reexamination. See, e.g., H.R. 1732, 104th Cong. § 3(e) (1995).
68. See Opprecht, 868 F.2d at 1265.
69. For a more detailed treatment see Federico, supra note 1, at 603-27.
70. See id. at 605, 609.
71. See Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350 (1882).
72. Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 169 (1892).
73. See Federico, supra note 1, at 619.
74. See id. at 625-27.
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Intervening rights eventually shifted from being rights of the
public that rendered a reissue invalid to personal rights that es-
topped the patentee from claiming infringement by particular defen-
dants. 5 This view of intervening rights was endorsed by the Su-
preme Court in 1940, which, without invalidating a reissued patent,
found a right to continue use of a machine that was procured
before the reissue even though its use infringed the claims of the
reissue. 6
2. Intervening Rights in the 1952 Patent Act
Intervening rights were codified for the first time in the Patent
Act of 1952. The result was not a mere codification of the law
as it stood.78 Two degrees of protection for those who infringe a
reissue were provided: one absolute (absolute intervening rights)
and the other at the discretion of the court (equitable intervening
75. See id. at 618-23. This view of intervening rights as personal had earlier been
explicitly rejected. See Stimpson v. West Chester R.R. Co., 45 U.S. (4 How.) 380, 402
(1846) (reversing a lower court on the basis of its jury instruction that an alleged
infringer's use of the subject matter of a reissued patent more than one year prior to the
application for reissue constituted a good defense).
76. See Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. National Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281 (1940).
77. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (current version is Title 35 of
the U.S.C.). See Federico, supra note 1, at 627.
78. See PJ. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 161, 206 (1993) (reprint of 35 U.S.C.A. 1 (1954)) ("The second paragraph of
section 252 . . . [of the 1952 Act] varies in some respects from the case law and should
be considered on its own terms."). But see St. Regis Paper Co. v. Bernis Co., 403 F.
Supp. 776, 791 (S.D. IM. 1975) ('[S]ection [252 para. 2] merely codified equitable princi-
ples devolved under the prior law:), rev'd on other grounds, 549 F.2d 833 (7th Cir.
1977). The current version of the statute reads:
No reissued patent shall abridge or affect the right of any person or his succes-
sors in business who made, purchased or used prior to the grant of a reissue
anything patented by the reissued patent, to continue the use of, or to sell to
others to be used or sold, the specific thing so made, purchased or used, unless
the making, using or selling of such thing infringes a valid claim of the reis-
sued patent which was in the original patent. The court before which such
matter is in question may provide for the continued manufacture, use or sale of
the thing made, purchased or used as specified, or for the manufacture, use or
sale of which substantial preparation was made before the grant of the reissue,
and it may also provide for the continued practice of any process patented by
the reissue, practice, or for the practice of which substantial preparation was
made, prior to the grant of the reissue, to the extent and under such terms as
the court deems equitable for the protection of investments made or business
commenced before the grant of the reissue.
35 U.S.C. § 252 para. 2 (1994).
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rights).79 These protections are a defense to a charge of infringe-
ments° and as such the burden of proof is on the intervenor. 1
Nearly identical protections are now available for those infringing
reexamined patents. 2
Absolute intervening rights provide an accused infringer with
the absolute right to use or sell a product that was made, used, or
purchased before the grant of the reissue patent as long as this
activity does not infringe a valid claim of the reissue patent that
was in the original patent. 3 The scope of the protection is narrow
in that it "extends only to the specific objects actually made before
the grant of the reissued patent."" This protection clearly applies
to narrowing, as well as broadening, reissues.85
Equitable intervening rights, in contrast, offer the possibility of
much broader protection, allowing the court to permit continuation
of infringing activities when the defendant began, or made substan-
tial preparations to begin, the infringing activity before the patent
was reissued.86 This protection is to be provided "to the extent
and under such terms as the court deems equitable for the protec-
79. See Federico, supra note 78, at 207.
80. See, e.g., BIC Leisure Prods. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
81. See Maxon Premix Burner Co. v. Mid-Continent Metal Prods. Co., 279 F. Supp.
164, 190 (N.D. lL. 1967) (holding that the defendant in an infringement suit has "the
burden of proving the essential facts of ... affirmative defenses"); cf., e.g., A.C.
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (in
banc) (holding that the defendant in infringement suit has burden of proof on all factual
elements of an equitable estoppel defense).
82. See 35 U.S.C. § 307(b). The intervening rights provision for reexamined patents,
unlike the one for reissued patents, does not provide protection for those who only of-
fered to sell the product in question before the correction of the patent. Compare § 252
with § 307(b).
83. See BIC, 1 F.3d at 1220-21.
84. Federico, supra note 78, at 207.
85. See id.; Mendenhall v. Astec Indus., Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1949 (E.D.
Tenn. 1988), affd, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1956 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Wayne-Gossard Corp. v.
Moretz Hosiery Mills, 384 F. Supp. 63, 73 (W.D.N.C. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
539 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter Moretz 1]; see also Plastic Container Corp. v.
Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 902 (10th Cir. 1979) (infringer "had the benefit of
several years' production [before the narrowing reissue] for which no damages can be
assessed"); Johnston v. Textron, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 783, 794 (D.R.I.), affd, 758 F.2d 666
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Wayne-Gossard Corp. v. Sandra Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1340, 1363 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) ("[D]efendants have the benefit of the five years of operation [before the nar-
rowing reissue] ... from which no damages can be assessed.'), affd, 579 F.2d 41 (3d
Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Sondra].
86. See BIC, 1 F.3d at 1221.
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tion of investments made or business commenced before the grant
of the reissue."' Relief under this provision is granted at the
court's discretion, and the "applicability of equitable considerations
is specifically contemplated by the statute.""8
The doctrine of equitable intervening rights clearly applies to
broadening reissues, although such cases are relatively
rare-reexamination and high rates of patent invalidity have made
narrowing revisions of patents more common.89 Equitable inter-
vening rights have been applied in three broadening reissue cases
where the intervenor acted on the advice of counsel that it did not
infringe the original patent.9°
In narrowing reissue cases the applicability of equitable inter-
vening rights has been less clear. The legislative history of the
1952 Act does not address the issue.91 P.J. Federico, who is cred-
ited as the primary author of the 1952 Patent Act,' provides
some support by implication for applicability.93 However, the leg-
islative history of the reexamination provisions can be read by
negative implication to oppose applying equitable intervening rights
to narrowing reissue cases. 94 There have been statements in the
case law both in favor of and opposed to general applicability.95
87. § 252.
88. Federico, supra note 1, at 633.
89. See 5 KAYTON, supra note 34, at 22.67 (narrowing of the claims is "[p]robably
the most frequently invoked ground for filing a reissue application").
90. See Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (intervenor designed around the original patent, following the advice of
counsel); Austin Powder Co. v. Atlas Powder Co., 593 F. Supp. 208, 216 (D. Del. 1984);
Gerhardt v. Kinnaird, 162 F. Supp. 858, 864 (E.D. Ky. 1958) (intervenor ceased licensing
the patent in reliance upon counsel's advice that the product did not infringe, and con-
verted practically its entire business to the infringing product).
91. See S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 7, 26 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2400-01, 2419-20; H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 8, 26 (1952).
92. See Louis S. Zarfiis, Notes From the Editor, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 160 (1975).
93. See Federico, supra note 78, at 207 (stating, in discussing intervening rights gener-
ally, that the 1952 Act "extends the protection of intervening rights to so-called narrowed
reissues," but not specifically addressing the applicability of equitable intervening rights to
narrowing reissues).
94. Only narrowing changes to the claims are permitted in a reexamination. See supra
note 63 and accompanying text. In explaining the purpose for applying the intervening
rights protections of § 252 to those infringing reexamined patents, only providing absolute
intervening rights protection for infringers is mentioned. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt.
1, at 8 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6467.
95. Compare Sondra, 434 F. Supp. 1340, 1363 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("[Ihe doctrine of
[equitable] intervening rights applies to narrowed reissue[s]."), affd, 579 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.
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In addition, courts have weighed various factors in individual
narrowing reissue cases. Cited as factors in favor of equitable
intervening rights have been the infringer's development of a sub-
stantial enterprise prior to reissue upon which numerous customers
relied,' and the infringer's good faith reliance on an opinion of
counsel.97 Many factors have been cited as weighing against the
grant of broad equitable intervening rights or against granting any
such rights at all: the fact that counsel was not consulted prior to
beginning the infringing activities; 98 the fact that investment be-
fore the reissue was "insignificant" compared with the post-reissue
investment; 9 where the infringer was not misled by the scope of
the original patent; where the infringer knew of the original
patent and the application and issuance of the reissue, and did not
attempt to avoid infringement;101 when the majority of expendi-
1978), Moretz I, 539 F.2d 986, 991 (4th Cir. 1976) ("[S]ection 252 applies to narrowed
reissue claims.'), and Loral Corp. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081,
1116 (S.D. Ohio) (implying that intervening rights can be granted based on a well-found-
ed belief in patent invalidity) rev'd on other grounds, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1396 (Fed.
Cir. 1989), with Henkel Corp. v. Coral Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1280, 1320 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
('The defense of intervening rights is unavailable when claims of a reissue patent are
narrowed, rather than broadened." (quoting Mendenhall v. Astec Indus., Inc., 13
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1948 (E.D. Tenn. 1988))), affd mere., 945 F.2d 416 (Fed. Cir.
1991), Colt Indus. Operating Corp. v. Index-Werke KG, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 990, 1005
(D.D.C. 1979) ("The doctrine of intervening rights does not apply to narrowed reissue
claims added by the reissue, especially where a broader claim of the original patent also
appears in the reissue."), and Moretz I, 384 F. Supp. 63, 74 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (since for
narrowing reissues "the infringer commences his activities in the inequitable position of an
infringer," intervening rights do not apply), rev'd, 539 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1976).
96. See Richardson-Vicks, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., Civ. A. No. 93-556-SLR, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 702, at *25-26 (D. Del. Jan. 17, 1996); Mine Safety Appliances Co. v.
Becton Dickinson & Co., 744 F. Supp. 578, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Reeves Bros.,
Inc. v. U.S. Laminating Corp., 282 F. Supp. 118, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding a claim
added by reissue not infringed due to intervening rights because the intervenors had been
conducting their activities for over two years before the patent was reissued.), affd, 417
F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1969).
97. See Richardson-Vicks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 702, at *25; Arcade Inc. v. Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578, 1592 (E.D. Tenn. 1991), aff'd
mem., 1 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Telcor, Inc. v. Recoton Corp., No. 89 Civ.
6032, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18186, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1991) (infringer believed
in good faith that it was not infringing the patent).
98. See Henkel, 754 F. Supp. at 1320; Loral, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116.
99. See White v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 263 F. Supp. 788, 812 (D. Conn. 1966), affd,
389 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1968).
100. See Moretz I, 384 F. Supp. at 75; White, 263 F. Supp. at 810-11;
101. See Henkel, 754 F. Supp. at 1320-21; Colt Indus. Operating Corp. v. Index-Werke
KG, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 990, 1005 (D.D.C. 1979); Corometrics Med. Sys. v. Berkely
Bio-Eng'g, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 467, 478 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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tures were made with knowledge that a reissue application had
been filed;1 2 where investments in the infringing activity could
be put to noninfringing use, 113 or had already been offset by pro-
fits; ° when "somewhat more expensive" non-infringing alterna-
tives were available;"5 when the activities at issue had begun
prior to the issue of the original patent; ' 6 and where infringe-
ment involved a narrower reissue claim, but a broader claim of the
original patent also appeared (without substantial change) in the
reissue patent. 7
There has been no consensus in the courts as to whether reli-
ance on the original patent is required in order for equitable inter-
vening rights to be invoked. The statute itself makes no mention of
a reliance requirement." 8 Neither the legislative history nor the
statements of Federico make reference to a reliance require-
ment.' 9 However, the pre-1952 application of intervening rights
suggests that such rights are in the character of an estoppel," °
102. See Henkel, 754 F. Supp. at 1308.
103. See Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 903 (10th Cir.
1979); Halliburton Co. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1973, 1983
(W.D. Okla.), affd, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Wayne-Gossard Corp. v.
Moretz Hosiery Mills, 447 F. Supp. 12, 16 (W.D.N.C. 1976) (only limited further in-
fringement allowed because infringer could "avoid infringement with relative ease"),
aff'd, 573 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Moretz 11].
104. See Plastic Container, 607 F.2d at 902-03; Mine Safety Appliance Co. v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., 744 F. Supp. 578, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Sondra, 434 F. Supp. 1340,
1363 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 579 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1978).
105. Henkel, 754 F. Supp. at 1308.
106. See Plastic Container, 607 F.2d at 902; Halliburton, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1983.
107. See Mendenhall v. Astec Indus., Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1948 (E.D.
Tenn. 1988), affd, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1956 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Colt Indus. Operating
Corp. v. Index-Werke KG, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 990, 997-98, 1005 (D.D.C. 1979); Coro-
metrics Med. Sys. v. Berkely Bio-Eng'g, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 467, 473-74 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
108. See Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1413
(E.D. Va. 1991), aff d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, vacated in part and re-
manded, 991 F.2d 735 (Fed. Cir. 1993). This is in contrast to an explicit reliance require-
ment in a later intervening rights provision applying to certain changes in the patent law
with regard to obviousness and joint inventorship. See Patent Law Amendments of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 106(d), 98 Stat. 3383, 3385-86 (1984).
109. Compare S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 26 (1952) (characterizing intervening rights as
designed "to protect legitimate activities which would be adversely affected by the grant
of a reissue"), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2419-20, and H.R. REP. No. 82-
1923, at 26 (1952), with Federico, supra note 78, at 206-08 and Federico, supra note 1,
at 630-33.
110. See e.g., Moto Meter Gauge & Equip. Corp. v. E.A. Lab., 55 F.2d 936, 940
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indicating that reliance is required. Courts have variously suggested
that reliance is required,"' properly considered,1 2 or not neces-
sary" for invoking equitable intervening rights.
Although under § 252 the "court's discretion to fashion the
terms of future dealings is extremely broad," 4 most equitable
intervening rights granted have been narrow in scope. A license to
continue royalty-free infringement has been allowed in only one
case,15 and has been explicitly rejected in others where some eq-
(E.D.N.Y. 1932).
111. See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., 810 F.2d 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(denying intervening rights because the infringer "did not demonstrate that it relied to its
detriment on any aspect of the original claims that was changed by reissue"); Kearney &
Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 596 (7th Cir. 1971) ("Section
252 was enacted to deal with the problem of intervening rights of third parties who may
have relied on the limited scope of the original patent before the reissue was allowed.");
Lockwood v. American Airlines, Civ. No. 91-1640-E(CM), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22077,
at *9, (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 1992) ("[A]n important element of the [intervening rights] de-
fense is reliance on some defect of the original patent . . . ."); Quad Envtl. Techs. v.
Union Sanitary Dist., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1667, 1670 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (for narrowing
reissues "some degree of reliance on the original patent is required to establish intervening
rights'), rev'd on other grounds, 946 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Loral Corp. v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1116 (S.D. Ohio 1989) ("[A]n infringer whose
actions are based neither on reliance upon the scope of the original patent nor upon a
'well-founded (belief) that the original patent . . . was invalid' is not entitled to have his
investment protected by" the doctrine of intervening rights. (bracketed alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Plastic Container, 607 F.2d at 902 n.42)), rev'd on other grounds, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Halliburton, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1983 ("The purpose of the statute [providing for equitable intervening rights] is to protect
investments which have been made in good faith reliance on some perceived infirmity in
the original patent"); Tennant Co. v. Hako Minuteman Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1167,
1169 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (no indication of reliance by infringer, though a plausible argument
for intervening rights could have been made out if there had been reliance), dismissed on
reconsideration, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd in part on other
grounds, vacated in part, 878 F.2d 1413 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Maxon Premix Burner Co. v.
Mid-Continent Metal Prods. Co., 279 F. Supp. 164, 178 (N.D. I1. 1967) (no intervening
rights found where there had been no reliance on the original patent).
112. See Halliburton Co. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1151, 1153
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished) ("[A] court may properly take into consideration the pres-
ence or absence of reliance in exercising its judgment on the equities in the case.').
113. See Austin Powder Co. v. Atlas Powder Co., 593 F. Supp. 208, 216 ("It is not
necessary . . . for the infringer to show reliance on the limited scope of the claims of
the original patent."); see also Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 756
F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (recapture by reissue is not permitted "at the expense
of innocent parties"); R.E. Phelon Co. v. Wabash, Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1680, 1694
(N.D. Ind. 1986) ('The doctrine of intervening rights protects persons who innocently
develop and manufacture an invention not specifically claimed by a patent."), affd in
part, vacated in part mem., 824 F.2d 977 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
114. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 744 F. Supp. 578, 580-81
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
115. See Gerhardt v. Kinnaird, 162 F. Supp. 858, 865 (E.D. Ky. 1958); see also Arcade
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uitable intervening rights were granted." 6 Limited continued in-
fringement for the protection of business commenced has been
allowed for recovery of the costs of converting equipment to non-
infringing uses,"7 for the exhaustion of inventory on hand and
the filling of orders received before the date of the reissue," 8
and until the end of the serviceable life of the infringer's machines
dedicated to producing the infringing product."9 Limited contin-
ued infringement for protection of the intervenor's investment has
also been considered.' The form of the allowance of continued
infringement has been an offset, either against infringement damag-
es'2 ' or against mandated royalties for the limited further in-
fringement allowed." A license for the life of the patent, with
payment of royalties at a specified rate, has also been awarded to
the infringer.'2
It can be seen from the foregoing that while there is a clearly
recognized need to provide some protection from the effects of a
reissue on those who have previously engaged in the newly patent-
Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578, 1592-93 (E.D. Tenn.
1991) (holding that continued manufacture would have been allowed had the patents at
issue not been found to be invalid and unenforceable); Iron Ore Co. of Can. v. Dow
Chem. Co., 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 34, 68 (D. Utah 1972) (finding the patent invalid, but
claims added in reissue would have been unenforceable against the accused infringer be-
cause of the infringer's intervening rights), amended, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 447 (D. Utah
1973), affd, 500 F.2d 189 (10th Cir. 1974); Reeves Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Laminating Corp.,
282 F. Supp. 118, 148-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding patent invalid and claims added by
the reissue not infringed, with an additional finding that intervenors "cannot be deemed
infringers" of one of the claims added by the reissue, because of intervening rights), affd,
417 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1969).
116. See Plastic Container, 607 F.2d at 902-03; Mine Safety, 744 F. Supp. at 581;
Moretz II, 447 F. Supp. 12, 16 (W.D.N.C. 1976), affd, 573 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1978).
117. See Plastic Container, 607 F.2d at 903; Moretz 11, 447 F. Supp. at 16.
118. See Seattle Box, 756 F.2d at 1581.
119. See Telcor, Inc. v. Recoton Corp., No. 89 Civ. 6032 (LLS), 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18186, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1991).
120. See Valmont Indus. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1383 (D.
Neb. 1990) ("If the defendant is found to be entitled to intervening rights ... the defen-
dant would have an equitable license to continue manufacturing its machines following
reissue for a length of time sufficient to allow it to recoup its investment made prior to
the reissue.'), rev'd on other grounds, 983 F.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
121. See Plastic Container, 607 F.2d at 903.
122. See Moretz II, 573 F.2d at 192.
123. See Richardson-Vicks, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., Civ. A. No. 93-556-SLR, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 702, at *26, (D. Del. Jan. 17, 1996) (mandating the royalty rate); see also
Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 744 F. Supp. 578, 581-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (setting the royalty rate as stipulated by the parties).
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ed activity, there is no consensus about who should be protected
and to what extent.
H. POLICY GOALS-THE ECONOMICS OF INTERVENING RIGHTS
The goal in selecting a set of rules for determining the scope
of a patent is to minimize the sum of the costs involved in patent
uncertainty. 24 These costs accrue to the government and to third
parties, as well as to the patentee, and can be broken into two
groups: the costs of determining what activities fall within the
scope of the invention, and the costs arising from uncertainty in
the patent's scope."z The first category comprises costs involved
in transmitting and evaluating information about the scope of the
invention; the second comprises the costs ensuing from the neces-
sarily imperfect dissemination of that information.
Costs of determining what activities fall within the scope of the
invention can further be broken down into costs to the patentee of
making the claims correspond more closely to the scope of the
invention, 26 the costs to third parties in gathering information
and evaluating the scope and validity of a patent, and the costs to
the parties and the court system of resolving disputes about the
scope of the patent. 27 More precise drafting of claims will re-
quire greater effort on the part of the patentee; this will lead to
diminishing returns of greater precision, as more resources are
spent in drafting the claims." Costs to third parties in evaluating
the scope of a patent are generally reduced as the precision of the
claims is increased. However, the costs to third parties would in-
crease if the claims and supporting materials became so volumi-
nous as to require significantly increased effort to interpret
124. See JOHN W. SCEuCHER, PATErNT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES §
7.02[l][b] (1994).
125. See id.
126. There is no significant cost to the government in the revision of the claims. Al-
though the government participates in the process through patent applicants' dealings with
the PTO, the PTO is fully funded by user fees paid by patent applicants. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1994) (establishing a patent fee schedule with fees adjusted to reflect fluctuations in
the Consumer Price Index); H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 2 (1982) ("The [§ 41] fee schedule
is designed to return to the government 100% of actual costs."), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 766.
127. See SCHUCHER, supra note 124, § 7.02[I][a].
128. See id. § 7.02[1][d] ("lit is costly to reduce uncertainty. The cost of preparing a
perfectly precise legal definition of the invention would be enormous.").
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them. 29 Costs involved in litigation regarding the scope of a pat-
ent are also expected to decrease as the precision of the claims
increases.
Besides the costs involved in making the scope of a patent
more certain, there are also the costs generated by the uncertainty
of the patent. The most obvious of these is the value of that part
of the invention that the patentee is unable to exploit (either by
licensing or infringement suit) due to uncertainty regarding the
patent. 30 To the extent that these costs occur, the patent system's
goal of stimulating invention will not be achieved."' A less ob-
vious cost of uncertainty is the value of products and activities out-
side the scope of the invention that will be foregone by third par-
ties due to uncertainty regarding the scope of the patent; many
firms and individuals will be unwilling to take the risk that they
will be found liable for infringement.' Another cost is the value
of complementary and substitute inventions not made due to uncer-
tainty about the scope of the patent.'33
A. Effect of Unavailability of Reissues.
Consider first the situation where patent reissues are unavail-
able. Having only one chance of obtaining a patent, patentees
would be driven to spend a large amount of resources in an at-
tempt to obtain claims that accurately reflect the scope of the in-
vention. However, due to the difficulty of accurately drawing up
claims'34 there would still be some difference between the scope
129. See id.
130. See id. § 7.02[1][a]; see also General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304
U.S. 364, 369 (1938) ("The limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the
patentee . . .
131. See SCHICHER, supra note 124, § 7.02[1][b].
132. See id. § 7.02[1][a]; see also General Elec., 304 U.S. at 369 ("The limits of a
patent must be known for . . . the encouragement of the inventive genius of others
133. See SCHuCHER, supra note 124, § 7.02[1][a]; see also Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 116 S. CL 1384, 1396 (1996) (noting that uncertainty in the terms of a
patent could create a "zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter
only at the risk of infringement claims[, and which] would discourage invention only a
little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the field." (quoting United Carbon Co. v.
Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942))).
134. See Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892) ("The specification and claims of
a patent ... constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with accura-
cy."); 5 KAYTON, supra note 34, at 22.40-.41 (characterizing patent drafting as "an envi-
ronment for mistake" where the patent practitioner must simultaneously perform the func-
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of the invention and the scope of the patent ('scope error"). To the
extent that the patentee overclaimed, the patent would be found
invalid when it is litigated, and the patentee would lose his or her
property right to the extent that narrower claims were not included
in the original patent.'35 A patentee who underclaimed, regardless
of the reason, would also have irretrievably lost a portion of the
value of the invention. In sum, the unavailability of reissue impos-
es high costs on the patentee, both in terms of the costs of reduc-
ing scope error, and in the value of the invention lost due to scope
error.
B. Effect of Availability of Reissue, in the
Absence of Intervening Rights
When reissues are made available, but intervening rights are
not, the situation for the patentee improves considerably. Unless the
cost of obtaining reissues is prohibitively high, their availability
would reduce the patentee's loss of revenue caused by scope error.
If the patentee discovered that an activity was being carried on that
was outside the scope of the patent claims but within the scope of
the invention, a reissue could be obtained covering the activity; this
would allow the patentee to proceed against the third party.'36
Moreover, it would be possible for a patentee, after losing an in-
fringement suit because of invalidity of the patent, to obtain a
reissue and proceed anew against the same infringer, even for acts
before the date of the reissue. 37 The statutory requirements for
reissue" and the cost to the patentee of obtaining a reissue
would still provide a check on the number of reissues obtained, but
dions of engineer, historian, epistemologist, mental gymnast, technical writer, educator,
salesman, and lawyer, all while facing constraints on resources and time).
135. The inclusion of narrower claims would increase the time and expense of drafting
the patent. It would also increase the patentee's expense of prosecuting it, since the PTO
charges additional fees on a per-claim basis for applications with more than twenty
claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(c) (1996).
136. This sort of behavior was commonplace throughout much of the nineteenth century.
See Federico, supra note 1, at 609 ("It. . . became established that there was an abso-
lute right to reissue any patent to broaden it, at any time during the life of the patent,
and that a patent so reissued was enforceable against any infringer.").
137. See, e.g., Edison v. American Mutoscope & Biograph Co., 151 F. 767 (2d Cir.
1907); Hubel v. Waldie, 35 F. 414 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).
138. These are that the "error" necessitating the reissue be "without any deceptive inten-
tions," that "no new matter shall be introduced into the application for reissue," and that
a reissue "enlarging the scope of the clim's" be applied for within two years. 35 U.S.C.
§ 251 (1994).
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to the extent that reissues would be available at a reasonable cost
the patentee would be in a better position to recover more of the
value of the invention.
1 39
While the availability of reissue is good for patentees, third
parties would suffer hardships in the absence of intervening rights.
The availability of reissue would have the effect of lowering the
precision of the claims in the original patent. Since costs to the
patentee due to the scope error are reduced by the availability (at a
reasonable cost) of reissues, the incentive for the patentee to mini-
mize scope error is also reduced. Therefore scope error increases
when reissues are available. This lack of precision and scope error
increases the need for determining the valid scope of the patent in
litigation, as opposed to from the patent itself; costs to third parties
are thereby increased."4
A more important source of uncertainty for third parties, how-
ever, is that arising from the possibility of a reissue. Since the
scope of a patent is changeable by the reissue process, uncertainty
about the ultimate scope of a patent also increases. There is there-
fore an increase in the cost to third parties in terms of activities
and research opportunities foregone due to this uncertainty.
Whether the benefits of a system where reissues, but not inter-
vening rights, are available outweighs the costs of such a system
need not be answered. But since a two-step process (here the origi-
nal prosecution plus a possible reissue) of defining the scope of the
patent can reduce the cost of achieving a given level of certain-
ty, reissues, if properly limited in availability or effect, have
the potential to be an important ingredient in minimizing the costs
associated with patent claims.
139. It is notable that the time limit for obtaining a broadening reissue developed as a
judicial response to the pernicious effects of nearly unconstrained availability of reissues.
See Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 354 (1881) (citing "the evils which have grown
from the practice" of reissuing patents as a reason for finding a broadening reissue invalid
because it was not filed within a "reasonable time"); Louis Robertson, The Chance of a
Lifetime-Liberalize Reissues, 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 821, 824 (1950) ("Mhe 'reasonable
time' requirement [of Miller] was designed to protect intervenors.").
140. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 247, 267 (1994) ("lit is important that the line between the patented and the
unpatented be clearly demarcated in the patent itself, rather than being left to future litiga-
tion, so that a green light is given to R & D beyond that line.").
141. See SCHLICHER, supra note 124, § 7.02[I][a] (noting that the same level of certain-
ty is provided at a lower cost by allowing courts some discretion to define patent rights
independent of the claims, as opposed to requiring the courts to rely on the claims alone).
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C. Effect of Availability of Intervening Rights-The
Characteristics of an Ideal Intervening
Rights System
The main undesirable side effect of a reissue system is the
avoidance of investment in areas related to the patent, while the
main benefit of intervening rights is that the patentee realizes from
the patent a value corresponding to the value of the invention.
Therefore, the goal of an intervening rights system should to be to
blunt the side effects of reissue, while retaining, as much as possi-
ble, the benefits of intervening rights.142 A further goal is to
avoid adding costly requirements and uncertainties to the system,
so as to continue to adhere to the general goal of minimizing the
costs associated with uncertainties about the scope of patent claims.
An ideal intervening rights system would provide clear guide-
lines, discernable at low cost, to third parties as to what invest-
ments would be protected by the award of intervening rights in the
event of a reissue. The line between those investments that would
be protected and those that would not should be drawn with two
related general aims in mind: (1) protecting investments that would
not have been made except for the scope error of the original
patent; and (2) protecting investments in activities that appeared
likely to fall outside the ultimate scope of the patent. The first of
these aims goes to the degree to which the intervenor was misled
by the original patent. The second goes to the reasonableness of
any reliance the intervenor had on the scope of the original patent.
The protection granted to intervenors should be designed to mini-
mize the negative impact on the value of the patent to the paten-
tee, while not unduly discouraging investment by third parties in
activities that could possibly be covered by a reissue. Finally, an
ideal intervening rights system would encourage actions to prompt-
ly and inexpensively resolve uncertainties about patent scope.
142. See Henkel Corp. v. Coral, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1280, 1320 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (charac-
terizing equitable intervening rights as "an equitable doctrine based on the balance be-
tween: (a) the public interest in the patent system and the remedial purpose of the reissue
statute; and (b) the private interest of an infringer who innocently and in good faith has
undertaken substantial activities that because of reissue turn out to be infringement',
affd, 945 F.2d 416 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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Im. A PROPOSAL REGARDING WHEN EQUITABLE
INTERVENING RIGHTS SHOULD BE GRANTED,
AND WHAT THEIR SCOPE SHOULD BE
In order to protect the legitimate investor without causing un-
due harm to the patentee, it is proposed that reasonable reliance by
the infringer on the pre-reissue state of affairs should be a neces-
sary prerequisite to the granting of equitable intervening rights. For
broadening reissues this would involve reliance that the infringing
activity falls outside the claims of the original patent; it generally
need not involve a belief in the inability of the patentee to secure
a reissue covering the activity.143 For narrowing reissues (and
other situations where the original patent is invalid) the reliance of
the infringer, in order to be reasonable, should be based on both a
belief that the patent is invalid and that it cannot or will not be
reissued to cover the activity.'"
It is further proposed that the courts should apply the power to
protect intervenors more broadly than has been done in the past.
Allowance of continued infringement, coupled with a payment of
reasonable royalties to the patentee, should be used liberally to
protect substantial business commenced by the intervenor. Allowing
unlimited, royalty-free infringement should be considered when
significant doubts (that do not rise to a level that would justify a
finding of invalidity) exist in regard to the propriety of the reissue,
or when the patentee has not diligently pursued a reissue following
the discovery of errors in the original patent. 45
This proposed approach to equitable intervening rights by no
means exhausts the considerations to be taken into account in
determining if equitable intervening rights should be allowed.1"
Nor are intervening rights the only defense available to an infringer
of a reissued patent.147
143. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
144. See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
145. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
146. See, e.g., Funchion v. Somerset Knitting Co., 158 F. Supp. 57 (M.D.N.C 1958)
(infringer, an employee of the patentee, used trade secrets and other confidential informa-
tion to build an infringing device and apply for and obtain a patent, and was thereby
found to have "unclean hands" and denied intervening rights).
147. See 4 CisuM, supra note 14, § 15.05[5] (reissue may be found invalid either
because it does not meet the requirements of patentability or because it does not meet the





Conditioning equitable intervening rights on good-faith reliance
in the original patent makes good sense. Requiring reliance distin-
guishes infringers that were misled by the errors of the original
patent from those who were indifferent to those errors such that
they would presumably have undertaken the infringing activity even
if the original patent had been correct. Since those of the latter
category would not have been discouraged by a patent of the cor-
rect scope, they are not deserving of protection from the conse-
quences of post-reissue infringement. 48 Therefore, reliance is
properly taken into account in deciding if equitable intervening
rights are justified. 49
In this section, two aspects of present patent law, the equitable
estoppel defense to infringement and the concept of willful in-
fringement, are introduced to help define the analogous concept of
reasonable reliance in the equitable intervening rights context.
Then, since the nature of the reliance for broadening reissues is
different from that for narrowing reissues, these two types of reis-
sues are treated separately. Finally, the situation where the activity
was undertaken without actual knowledge of the patent is briefly
addressed.
1. Equitable Estoppel and Willful Infringement and Their
Application to Equitable Intervening Rights
Equitable estoppel is a defense to infringement that arises
"when (1) the patent owner through conduct, positive statement, or
misleading silence represents to the infringer that his business will
be unmolested by claims of infringement, and (2) in reliance on
that representation, the infringer continues or expands his busi-
ness." ° The court may apply it at its discretion.' 5 ' For equita-
148. Cf. Fonar Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (de-
nying any intervening rights protection for an infringer of a patent that temporarily lapsed
due to nonpayment of a maintenance fee, on the ground that the infringing activity, hav-
ing commenced before the patent lapsed, was not undertaken "in reliance on the lapse,"
and therefore was not "the type of activity that [35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(2)] was intended to
protect').
149, See Halliburton Co. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1151, 1153
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished).
150. 5 CHIsuM, supra note 14, § 19.05[31, at 19-455.
151. See Williams Service Group, Inc. v. O.B. Cannon & Son, Inc., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d
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ble estoppel to apply, not only must the infringer be aware of the
patentee, but the patentee must also be aware of the infringer.'52
A successful assertion of equitable estoppel "totally bars any asser-
tion of the patent claim" against that particular infringer."
Willful infringement, in contrast, is not a shield used by the
infringer, but rather is a sword wielded by the patentee. When
damages for infringement are found by a jury or assessed by the
court, "the court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed." '154 These increased damages can be
awarded, at the discretion of the court, upon a clear and convinc-
ing showing of willful and wanton infringement.55 The increased
damages are not considered an equitable remedy." 6 Although the
infringer's conduct "under all the circumstances" is evaluated to
determine whether "a reasonable person would prudently conduct
himself with any confidence that a court might hold the patent
invalid or not infringed,"'' 57 the most important factor in such a
determination is whether an opinion of competent counsel has been
obtained and followed.!58 Therefore, before embarking on poten-
tially infringing activity, third parties have a "duty to seek and
obtain competent legal advice,"'59 but by obtaining and following
such advice one can be a good-faith infringer."6
These two concepts of patent law are useful in evaluating the
estoppel underlying equitable intervening rights. Equitable estoppel
(BNA) 1705, 1733 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
152. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1042 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (in banc).
153. Adelberg Lab. v. Miles, Inc., 921 F.2d 1267, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
154. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
155. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). The court also has the power to award the patentee attorney fees. See 35
U.S.C. § 285.
156. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d
1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
157. Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
158. See Donald L. Cox, Opinions of Counsel in Patent Litigation, in 2 PATENT LMGA-
TION 1994, at 569, 575 (PLI Pat., Copy., Trademark, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook
Series No. 397, 1994); 5 CISUM, supra note 14, § 20.03[4][v], at 20-184.9. But see
Machinery Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 472 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("There is
no per se rule that an opinion letter from patent counsel will necessarily preclude a find-
ing of willful infringement ... nor is there a per se rule that the lack of such a letter
necessarily requires a finding of willfuiness.") (citations omitted).
159. Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991).




provides an analogous situation where reasonable reliance on the
misleading actions of a patentee lead a third party to commence,
continue, or expand an infringing activity. Willful infringement
provides some guidance as to. what is reasonable behavior for one
contemplating beginning an infringing or potentially infringing
activity. Together, with allowances for the equitable nature of inter-
vening rights, these concepts can be used to help define when
invocation of equitable intervening rights is appropriate.
2. Broadening Reissues-Reliance on a Belief of
Inapplicability of the Original Patent
One considering whether or not an activity is in the public
domain might reasonably proceed with the activity based upon a
good-faith conclusion that a patent in the same field of endeavor is
inapplicable to the activity. The elements of such a belief would
be:
(1) that the scope of the claims does not encompass the
activity, either directly or by the doctrine of equiva-
lents;' 6' and
(2) that the claims will not be revised (broadened) to en-
compass the activity.
Consequences flow from mistakes in each of these beliefs (or as-
sumptions).
a. Mistaken Belief that the Claims Do Not
Encompass the Activity
A mistaken belief in the first element, that the claims of the
original patent did not encompass the activity, results in infringe-
ment of the patent. If the mistake is based upon reliance on an
opinion of competent counsel that the activity was non-infringing,
then the infringement will be found to be non-willful. 162 The
same result will follow if the infringing actions are taken without
knowledge of the patent. 63 If the mistake is made with knowl-
161. For a brief explanation of the doctrine of equivalents see supra note 14.
162. See Reed Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Those
cases where willful infringement is found despite the presence of an opinion of counsel
generally involve situations where opinion of counsel was either ignored or found to be
incompetent.").
163. See Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 511 (Fed.
Cir. 1990). A willfulness inquiry focusses on when the infringing activity began or when
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edge of the patent and is not based upon reliance of an opinion of
counsel, the infringement will probably be found to be willful.'6
b. Mistaken Belief that the Patent Scope Will Not Be
Broadened to Encompass the Activity
If the original patent's claims do not encompass the activity,
but the patent is reissued with broader claims encompassing the
activity, then the classic intervening rights situation with a broaden-
ing reissue develops. Here the patentee has failed his duty "to
inform the public.., of the limits of the monopoly asserted."'16
The responsibility for this failure rests squarely on the shoulders of
the patentee.16 The failure is clearly misleading in that the reis-
sue claims something for which protection was not asserted by the
original patent. Therefore it would be reasonable to conclude that
the infringer was misled, 67 unless the infringer was unaware of
the patent. 6  Generally the infringer in such a situation need not
produce any evidence supporting the reasonableness of the belief
that the patent would not be reissued in broader form, since such
reissues are the exception, rather than the rule. 69 However, reli-
the infringer became aware of the patent, whichever is later. See 5 CmsUM, supra note
14, § 20.03[4][b][v][F].
164. See Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Where an
infringer has actual notice of a patentee's rights, the infringer has an affirmative duty of
due care . . . which normally includes the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice
from counsel regarding the potential infringement."). But see Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE
Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (no willful infringement where
infringer did not seek an opinion of counsel but did attempt to design around the patent);
Gustafson, 897 F.2d at 510 ("Whether an act is 'willful' [or not] is by definition a ques-
tion of the actor's intent.").
165. Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931).
166. See SCHLICHER, supra note 124, § 7.02[1[b] ("[T]he law does not ... prohibit
claims that are narrower than the invention .... The patent owner is relied on to avoid
that result.").
167. See St. Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co., 403 F. Supp. 776, 792 (S.D. In. 1975)
("[A] practitioner may rely upon the claims of a patent as the total statement of the
inventive concept claimed.'), rev'd on other grounds, 549 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1977).
168. See infra Part IV.A.4.
169. See Gerhardt v. Kinnaird, 162 F. Supp. 858, 864 (E.D. Ky. 1958). Although a
showing of the reasonableness of reliance is not required, evidence of attempts to design
around the original patent can bolster the argument for equitable intervening rights. See
Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Arcade Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578, 1592-
93 (E.D. Tenn. 1991). But see Austin Powder Co. v. Atlas Powder Co., 593 F. Supp.
208, 216 (D. Del. 1984) (citing the infringer's independent development as a factor favor-
ing the grant of equitable intervening rights).
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ance would not generally be reasonable for investments made with
actual knowledge that a reissue had been filed.17°
It makes economic sense to allow an intervenor a presump-
tion17' in favor of the reasonableness of a belief that a patent
will not be reissued in broader form." There was no notice in
the original patent that the patentee was asserting the scope of
coverage later obtained in the reissue. Since the patentee was aware
of and relied upon the original patent, it is likely that the infring-
ing activity would not have been undertaken had the original patent
been accurate. And since less than one percent of patents are reis-
sued,"73 the now-infringing activity appeared likely to fall outside
the ultimate scope of the patent. To hold that the infringer in such
a situation must take the risk that a patent will be reissued in
broader form would discourage investments in areas close too, but
outside of, patents. Therefore concerns of probability, fairness to
the intervenor, and the social benefits of encouraging reliance on
issued patents all argue in favor of a presumption here. 174 In ac-
170. Cf 5 KAYTON, supra note 34, at 22.49 (the argument for applying equitable inter-
vening rights to narrowing reissues is "undercut ... somewhat by the fact that the reis-
sue applications are not maintained in secrecy" since the infringer "is likely to be aware
of the pendency of the reissue application and to be on notice of its impending issu-
ance").
171. The meaning of the term "presumption" as used here is what has been referred to
as its standard definition: "[A] rule of law which provides that if a particular group of
facts has been established, another fact is deemed established." Kenneth S. Broun, The
Unfulfllable Promise of One Rule for All Presumptions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 697, 698
(1984).
172. Although presumptions do not have a place in purely equity-based jurisprudence,
such a jurisprudence would provide "little clue as to what is non-litigious conduct." J.
Harvie Wilkinson Il1, Toward a Jurisprudence of Presumptions, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 907,
909 (1992) (arguing for a presumption-based jurisprudence as rejecting "the stark alterna-
tives of the rules-oriented and equity-based approaches" to jurisprudence). Accordingly, in
another equitable defense to infringement, a presumption of laches arises when a patentee
has delayed filing suit for more than six years. See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L.
Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1034-35 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (in banc). The presumption
of laches has the purpose of providing "a yardstick for reaching comparable results in
comparable circumstances rather than leaving the matter without any guidelines to a dis-
trict court's exercise of discretion." Id. at 1035.
173. See 5 KAYTON, supra note 34, at 22.41.
174. See Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (in banc)
("Presumptions depend on considerations of fairness and public policy."); 2 CHARLES T.
McCoRMIcK, MCCORMICK ON EvDNcE § 343 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (not-
ing that social and economic policies, difficulties inherent in proving a fact, and (most
importantly) probability are all factors that go into the creation of presumptions).
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cord with the equitable nature of intervening rights, this presump-
tion would be rebuttable. 75
3. Narrowing Reissues-Reliance on a Belief of Unpatentability
Besides believing that it falls outside the scope of the patent,
another way someone could conclude that an activity was within
the public domain would be for him to have a good-faith belief
that it was unpatentable, even though a patent might cover it. The
elements of such a belief would be:
(1) that prior art with priority over the patent covers the
claims that the activity would infringe (thus invalidating
those claims);
(2) that the claims will not be narrowed in such a way as
to avoid invalidity with respect to the prior art and yet still
cover the activity; and
(3) that the patent's priority date will not be changed.
As with a belief in inapplicability of a patent, different conse-
quences flow from mistakes involving each of these elements.
a. Mistaken Belief that Prior Art Invalidates the Original Claims
A mistake in the first element results in infringement of the
original patent, which, as in a broadening reissue, can be either
willful or non-willful, depending on the circumstances. The only
difference here is that a finding of willfulness is almost certain in
the absence of an opinion of counsel, since a court would be un-
likely to find that reliance on a layman's opinion of patent invalid-
ity is reasonable. 76
b. Mistaken Belief that the Claims Would Not Be Revised so
that a Valid Claim Covered the Activity
A mistake in the second element presents the intervening rights
situation for narrowing reissues. By failing to produce a valid
claim covering the activity, the patentee has failed a duty to "clear-
175. Cf., e.g., A.C. Aukennan, 960 F.2d at 1034 (holding that the presumption of laches
is rebuttable).
176. See Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
("Infringers should not escape a finding of willfulness by merely denying themselves
counsel's advice while relying on opinions of lay-employees."); Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. King
Aluminum Co. 381 F. Supp. 649, 653 (S.D. Ohio 1974) ('The opinions of laymen on
matters of [patent] law are entitled to little weight"), affd, 525 F.2d 775 (6th Cir. 1975).
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ly distinguish what is claimed from what went before in the [prior]
art."
177
The narrowing reissue situation presents a less compelling
argument for equitable intervening rights than the broadening reis-
sue situation. Unlike for broadening reissues, here the patentee has
asserted in the original patent that the activity in question is within
the patent's scope; the patent does not mislead a potential interve-
nor into thinking that her activities would remain unmolested.
7 1
Further, the infringer cannot presume that the patent will not be
reissued, since if a patent is found to be invalid and can be profit-
ably reissued, the patentee would be expected to pursue a narrow-
ing reissue.
However, equitable intervening rights are still warranted in
some narrowing reissue cases. Since the patentee has failed its duty
to properly draw the line demarcating the patentable aspects of its
invention, third parties who rely on their own reasonable, good-
faith attempts to draw that line should receive some protection.
In order to gain the protection of equitable intervening rights,
an infringer should generally have to establish a reasonable belief
that the activity in question would not be includable in a reissue. It
has been suggested that equitable intervening rights in narrowing
reissues can accrue simply on the basis of a belief in the invalidity
of the original patent.'7 9 However, this focus on a determination
of invalidity would undermine the distinction between activities
reasonably thought to be outside the scope of the invention (which
should be protected) and activities within that scope (for which
177. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).
178. See Harold M. Knoth, Some Aspects of the Narrowed Reissue, 24 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 26, 30 (1942).
179. See 4 CresuM, supra note 14, § 15.05[4] ("Where the reissue narrows the claims,"
the infringer "may rely on the invalidity through vagueness or undue breath of the origi-
nal claims" and thereby be entitled to equitable intervening rights); 4 DONALD R. DUINNER
ET AL., PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 10.8, at 10-114 (2d ed. 1988) ("[Olne should also
be able to rely on one's evaluation of the invalidity of an original patent claim .... and
should not be held to infringe a reissued claim which is valid only because it is narrow-
er.'); see also Loral Corp. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1116 (S.D.
Ohio 1989) (no intervening rights should be granted in a narrowing reissue situation un-
less the infringer had a well-founded belief in the invalidity of the original patent), rev'd
on other grounds, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Halliburton Co. v. West-
em Co. of N. Am., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1973, 1983 (W.D. Okla.) ("The purpose of the
statute [providing for equitable intervening rights] is to protect investments which have
been made in good faith reliance on some perceived infirmity in the original patent"),
affd, 12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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equitable intervening fights should not accrue). It would allow the
infringers to escape damages when the patentee used a reissue or
reexamination procedure merely to correct a minor error, which is
contrary to the purpose of § 252.180 Therefore, in order to be act-
ing reasonably in relying on a belief in patent invalidity, a poten-
tial infringer must act in the belief that the patent will not be
reissued. In contrast to the inapplicability reliance, where the inter-
venor relies upon the patentee's statement of the limit of the scope
of the patent, here the intervenor generally must make a determina-
tion as to what the limits would be of a valid reissue that the
patentee could reasonably secure. The limits on the reissue that the
patentee could secure could be based on prior art, public use, pros-
ecution history estoppel, deceptive intent, or (perhaps) unreasonable
delay in seeking reissue.'
By analogy to willful infringement cases, proof of good-faith
reliance on inapplicability could be established by an opinion of
qualified counsel, obtained prior to beginning the infringing activi-
ty."' In another intervening rights context, a legal opinion of in-
validity seems to have been intended by Congress as a requirement
for the granting of equitable intervening rights.'83 However, as in
willful infringement cases,184 there should be no per se require-
ment of an opinion of counsel. Such a requirement would be in-
consistent with the equitable nature, of intervening rights. 85 Nev-
180. See Tennant Co. v. Hako Minuteman Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1167, 1169 (N.D.
Ill. 1987), dismissed on reconsideration, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd
in part on other grounds, vacated in part, 878 F.2d 1413 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
181. See Ex parte Lafferty, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 202, 203-04 (PTO Bd. App. 1975)
('ln the absence of [intervening rights], an application for narrowed reissue may not be
denied on the grounds of delay or lack of diligence in filing the reissue application.").
182. If the infringing activity was begun before the issue of or in ignorance of the
patent, then an opinion could be sought when the infringer learned of the patent. Cf 5
CFiSUM, supra note 14, § 20.03[4][b][v][F] (noting a similar requirement for avoiding
willful infringement).
183. The Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 provided intervening rights protection
for infringers who had reasonably relied on invalidity or unenforceability of a patent un-
der the prior state of the law. See supra note 9. A document introduced in the congres-
sional debate on the bill explained that the intervening rights protection was intended for
those "who acted in reasonable and good faith reliance." SECrION-BY-SECnION ANALYSIS
OF H.R. 6286, PATENT LAW AMENDMENTS ACr OF 1984, 130 CONG. REc. 28,069, 28,072
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5836. However, in discussing the burden of
proof for establishing reliance, the document made reference only to reliance on "a legal
opinion ... that a certain patent or patents were invalid." Id.
184. See Machinery Corp. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 472 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
185. See HENRY L. McCINToCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY 29 (lst ed. 1936) ("[E]quity
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ertheless, a duty to obtain such an opinion before beginning a
potentially infringing activity already exists"6 and some such
opinions already include an analysis of the scope of a reissue that
could be obtained.'87 Therefore some equitable intervening rights
claims would almost certainly be supported by opinions of coun-
sel.'88 Claims not based on an opinion of counsel would have
their reasonableness judged on a case-by-case basis.' 89 While a
requirement of reliance on a belief that the patent would not be
reissued will deter those infringers who would attempt to use a
minor error to obtain intervening rights, it would still allow the
possibility of intervening rights in most narrowing reissue cas-
es,190 as evidenced by the fact that most intervening rights cases
include an argument for invalidity of the reissue.'91
looks to the intent, rather than to the form.").
186. See Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed.
Cir. 1983); see also Thomas L. Creel, Reliance on Opinions as a Defense in Patent In-
fringement Litigation, in 2 PATENT LMGATION 1994, at 599, 609 (PLI Pat., Copy., Trade-
mark, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 397, 1994) ("The safer practice
would appear to be to always request an opinion before . . . entry into the market with a
new product."); Cox, supra note 158, at 583 ("A written opinion of counsel should be
obtained as soon as the potentially infringed patent is discovered.").
The requirements for such an opinion are quite rigorous. See Underwater Devices,
717 F.2d at 1390 (holding that to remove any doubt that the infringer received a compe-
tent opinion of counsel, the opinion should have "contained within its four comers a
patent validity analysis, properly and explicitly predicated on a review of the file histories
of the patents at issue, and an infringement analysis that, inter alia, compared and con-
trasted the potentially infringing method or apparatus with the patented inventions").
187. See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944-45 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(besides addressing invalidity of the patent at issue, the opinion letter of counsel "also
makes reference to potential divisional applications, concluding that any claims in the divi-
sional applications broad enough to include Ortho's product would be invalid for the same
reasons as the . . . patent" at issue).
188. See Lockwood v. American Airlines, Civ. No. 91-1640-E(CM), 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22077, at *9, (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 1992) ("An attorney's opinion is normally an
integral part of [an intervening rights] defense.").
189. See RJ. Eifler, Reissues and Intervening Rights, 54 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 310, 316
(1972) ("[A]reas considered by the court will include . . . the credibility and reasonable-
ness of the infringer's reliance . . . [and] the extent an infringer may rely on his opinion
(and his counsel's) that a claim of a patent is invalid and may be ignored.).
190. The opinion would necessarily have to be incorrect for an intervening rights issue
to arise (that is, the opinion would have to be that the patentee would not obtain a reis-
sue to cover the activity, and such a reissue would be the basis for the infringement
action). However, this is not a bar to its usefulness as a shield for the intervenor, any
more than the incorrectness of an opinion of non-infringement or invalidity eliminates its
value as a defense to a charge of willful infringement.
191. See, e.g., White v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 263 F. Supp. 788, 791 (D. Conn. 1966),
affd, 389 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1968).
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There should be no requirement for the infringer to seek reex-
amination of the patent at issue in order to later make a claim for
equitable intervening rights. It might seem reasonable, in the inter-
est of promoting prompt resolution of patent uncertainties, for the
infringer to put its belief of unpatentability to the test through the
reexamination process, since reexamination "represents a relatively
expedited and inexpensive mechanism to test patent validity."'
192
However, reexamination may be unavailable to test the ground that
the infringer is relying on to unpatentability, since a
reexamination's scope is limited to consideration of prior art pat-
ents and printed publications 3  And even if reexamination is
available to the challenger, it presents numerous disadvantages:
having the patent reexamined by the same examiner who examined
the original patent, 94 being unable to effectively participate in
the proceeding, 95 and being unable to appeal an adverse deci-
sion.196 These more than make up for the asserted challenger's
advantages of a lower standard of proof for invalidity, 97 more
192. Shear & Galliani, supra note 54, at 669.
193. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
194. See William J. Speranza & Michael L. Goldman, Reexamination-The Patent
Challenger's View, 15 AIPLA QJ. 85, 93 (1987) (noting that the same examiner who
handled the original application will generally also handle the reexamination is "generally
considered disadvantageous for the challenger" because "the same examiner will be less
likely to overturn his handiwork" than a judge or jury in an infringement action); Gregor
N. Neff, Patent Reexamination-Valuable, But Flawed: Recommendations for Change, 68
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 575, 586 (1986) (noting that 54% of practitioners
surveyed cited examiner selection as a reason for their decision not to seek reexamina-
tion).
195. See Shear & Galliani, supra note 54, at 669 ("Absent the ... rigor of cross-ex-
amination and rebuttal affidavits, the patentee is placed in a favorable position."); Donald
R. Dunner & Charles E. Lipsey, Patent Reexamination or Patent Reissue-Which is the
Best Way to Test the Validity of a U.S. Patent, 2 PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PATS.,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS 117, 127 (1981) ("Mhe extremely limited participation
allowed a third party in the reexamination procedure puts him at a disadvantage vis-A-vis
the patent owner."); Neff, supra note 194, at 585 (noting that 81% of practitioners sur-
veyed cited limitations on third-party participation as a significant factor in not seeking
reexamination).
196. See Neff, supra note 194, at 585-86 (noting that 76% of practitioners surveyed
cited the lack of a right to appeal as a significant factor in their decisions not to seek
reexamination).
197. The 35 U.S.C. § 282 presumption of patent validity does not apply to reexamina-
tions. See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985). As a result, instead of finding
clear and convincing proof to find invalidity, a preponderance of the evidence standard is
used. See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
However, this supposed benefit to the challenger in a reexamination is less than it
appears to be. The presumption of validity is more easily overcome in litigation when the
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favorable claims construction,19 and the ability to remain anony-
mous 9 -9 the patent reexamination proceeding simply presents an
unfair forum for the challenger."° This possibility of an unfair
forum is particularly perilous for a challenger in view of the possi-
ble harm of the patentee prevailing in a reexamination: the applica-
bility of an increased presumption of validity with respect to prior
art considered in the reexamination,201 the possible denial of in-
tervening rights on the basis of the challenger's participation in the
reexamination proceeding,' and the psychological damage to the
infringer in subsequent litigation. 3  Therefore reexamination
should be considered only "a useful . . . alternative for challeng-
ers 1 2  and not a requirement in order to later claim intervening
rights.20
5
patent is challenged on the basis of prior art more relevant than the art considered in the
original application. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350,
1358-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The situation in reexamination "falls precisely within this con-
cept' and therefore inapplicability of the presumption in reexaminations is compatible with
the standard applied in infringement actions, at least where the newly cited art is material-
ly different from what was considered in the original examination. Etter, 756 F.2d at 861
(Nies, J., concurring).
198. Claims subject to reexamination, like claims in a patent application before the
PTO, are "given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification."
In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting In re Reuter, 651 F.2d
751, 756 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (quoting In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (C.C.P.A.
1969))). In an infringement action, however, the claims are "construed liberally to uphold
the patent's validity." Id. (quoting Photo Elecs. Corp. v. England, 581 F.2d 772, 776 (9th
Cir. 1978)).
199. See 35 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (providing that a person citing prior art for the pur-
poses of reexamination can keep his or her identity confidential). The benefits of this
anonymity are mitigated somewhat by the fact that the identity of the citator can be dis-
covered if he or she is later sued for infringement. See 5 KAYTON, supra note 34, at
22.100.
200. See Neff, supra note 194, at 575.
201. See Custom Accessories, Inc., v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., 807 F.2d 955, 961 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (holding that an infringer seeking to establish invalidity using prior art similar to
that considered in a reexamination which upheld validity faces a heavier burden).
202. Cf Henkel Corp. v. Coral Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1280, 1321 (N.D. IM. 1990) ('Equita-
ble intervening rights are inapplicable" because the challenger knew of the application for
reissue and "fully participated in those proceedings from the beginning:), affd, 945 F.2d
416 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
203. See Dunner & Lipsey, supra note 195, at 127.
204. H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6467 (emphasis added).
205. See In re Continental Gen. Tire, Inc., 81 F.3d 1089, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that a judge has no power to compel an accused infringer to file a request for reex-
amination, and stating that an infringer who has been sued "has the right to have its
defenses considered by a federal district court, without first being compelled to go to the
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c. Mistaken Belief that the Patent's Priority Date
Would Not Be Changed
A mistake in the third element occurs when the patent is reis-
sued to revise its priority date. Intervening rights should generally
be allowed in such a situation where the infringer relied on the
original date in assessing patentability, since the priority date of a
patent is not generally subject to change. Further, any mistake is
likely the fault of the patentee. However, if the evidence for the
revised priority date is in the prosecution history of the patent, the
strength of the argument in favor of granting equitable intervening
rights is reduced, at least where an opinion of counsel has been
sought. This is because a review of the file history is "a normal
and necessary preliminary to a validity or infringement opin-
ion,' " so reliance under such circumstances would not be rea-
sonable. Although no cases have been decided on this point, there
is support in dicta for this proposition. °
4. Activities Undertaken Without Knowledge of the Patent
An interesting question occurs when the investment arises with-
out knowledge of the patent, either because of ignorance or be-
cause the original patent has not yet issued. In a pre-1952 case, the
Supreme Court found that (what would now be termed) absolute
intervening rights existed where the infringer was unaware of the
patent when the infringing machine was built. 8 This ruling was
made on the basis that there was constructive notice to all when
PTO").
206. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir.
1983); see also Cox, supra note 158, at 584 ("[Vjalidity or infringement opinions . . . in
all cases should include an analysis of the file history.").
207. See Fontijn v. Okamoto, 518 F.2d 610, 623-24 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (stating that inter-
vening rights possible if infringer has been misled by the failure to originally claim a
priority date); Brenner v. State of Israel, 400 F.2d 789, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see also
Kelly Mfg. Co. v. Lilliston Corp., 636 F.2d 919, 920-21 (4th Cir. 1980) (denying inter-
vening rights to an infringer that was aware of the right of the patentee to an earlier
priority date). But see St. Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co., 403 F. Supp. 776, 792 (S.D.
111. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 549 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1977) (disallowing intervening
rights where a patent was reissued to claim an earlier priority date, on the basis that an
infringer infringes the inventive concept of the claims at his own risk); cf. In re Schuurs,
218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (Conum'r Pat. 1983) (stating that intervening rights do not
arise when a certificate of correction is used to perfect a claim to an earlier priority
date).
208. See Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. National Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281, 295 (1940).
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the patent issued, and that one with implied knowledge of the
patent should not be placed in a position inferior to one with actu-
al knowledge.2' It is unnecessary to resort to such a theory of
constructive reliance to invoke absolute intervening rights under the
current law.2"0 The question of equitable intervening rights is bet-
ter approached by requiring reliance and therefore protecting activi-
ties to the degree that they were undertaken because the original
patent was in error."' Thus equitable intervening rights would be
denied altogether for one acting in ignorance of the patent prior to
the reissue." 2 But where investments were made without knowl-
edge of the patent and the infringer subsequently learned of the
patent prior to the reissue, equitable intervening rights could be
awarded on the basis of reliance upon the patent for additional
investment in or continuation of the activity.213
209. See id.
210. See Haden Schweitzer Corp. v. Arthur B. Myr Indus., 901 F. Supp. 1235, 1242-43
(E.D. Mich. 1995) (interpreting similar intervening rights provision in 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(2)
by applying § 252 precedents and holding that "'[r]eliance' is not required in the
'absolute' [intervening rights] context"); Federico, supra note 78, at 207 ("The specific
things made before the date of the reissue, which infringe the new reissue claims, are
absolutely free of the reissued patent and may be used or sold .. . without regard to the
patent.").
211. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
212. See Otis Elevator Co. v. Atlantic Elevator Co., 47 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1931)
(Hand, Learned, J.).
213. As stated by one court:
To create an estoppel it would in principle seem sufficient, if any act of the
patentee led the defendant, between the issuance of the patent and the applica-
tion for the reissue, to a course of conduct inconsistent with the claims of the
later patent, even though such conduct was but a continuance of that which the
defendant had done prior to the original issue.
Moto Meter Gauge & Equip. Co. v. E.A. Lab., Inc., 55 F.2d 936, 940 (E.D.N.Y. 1932);
see also Halliburton Co. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1973, 1983
(W.D. Okla.) (disallowing equitable intervening rights not allowed because the vast majori-
ty of investments were made before the issuance of the patent, and no evidence of reli-
ance was presented for investments made subsequent to the issuance of the patent), affd,
12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1989). But see Federico, supra note 78, at 207 (mak-
ing reference to intervening rights generally. "If the intervenor acted before the grant of
the reissue he is protected under the circumstances mentioned in the statute. It is inmnmate-
rial how long before the date of reissue he started, if he started before the grant of the
original patent he is still protected by the language of the statute.').
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B. Scope of Rights Granted
"Under 35 U.S.C. § 252, a court's discretion to fashion the
terms of future dealings is extremely broad.""21 The court's dis-
cretion can be employed to protect "investments made or business
commenced before the grant of the reissue. 215 Although the
phrase "business commenced" is ambiguous, 1 6 the equitable pur-
pose of § 252 suggests a broad interpretation of the term. 7
As defined by the courts, equitable intervening rights could
take a number of forms, none of which is without serious short-
comings. The availability of a broad range of remedies is consis-
tent with the equitable nature of the defense and is an indication
that no single remedy is likely to be applicable to all, or perhaps
even most, intervening rights situations.218 Accordingly, the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of several possible types of remedies
must be explored.
214. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 744 F. Supp. 578, 580-81
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
215. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (1994).
216. It could mean either "specific business, such as a particular contract[,] or general
business, such as a commercial enterprise or part thereof." Silverman, supra note 4, at
716.
217. See id. ("It is perhaps more consistent with the equitable basis for the right to
assume the broader latter interpretation was intended."); see also Jo. Bally Brown, Inter-
vening Rights in Reissue Patent Cases, 15 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 333, 347 (1933) (arguing
that an intervenor should have a right to "normal growth and extension" of business
under an intervening right, applying the "general equities as between the parties" to pro-
tect the good will of the intervenor's customers, which was acquired in good faith).
There is no clear sense of the legislative intent. Federico, the primary author of the
Patent Act of 1952, wrote of the broad range of protection available. See Federico, supra
note 1, at 633 (stating that the court "may confine the defendant to the pre-existing
things only, or may permit continuation of manufacture with conditions such as, for ex-
ample, limitations in amount or place, or permit unconditional continuation"). On the other
hand, the sparse legislative history states that the second paragraph of § 252 gives "the
ourt... discretion to protect legitimate activities which would be adversely affected by
the grant of a reissue." S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 26 (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2419-20; H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 26 (1952). The use of the term
"activities" instead of "activity" could be read to suggest that protection was intended for
specific acts of business, as opposed to business in general.
218. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 185, at 42 (arguing that a court of equity has the
power to "mold its decree to meet the needs of the situation"); AEisToTE, THE
NIcoMA¢cmAN ETHcs 180 (J.E.C. welldon trans., Prometheus Books ed. 1987) ("IT]he
nature of the equitable ... is a rectification of law where it fails through generality.").
INTERVENING RIGHTS
1. Limited Infringement After the Reissue
Limited post-reissue infringement (followed by an injunction
against further infringement) has been granted to the intervenor in
several cases.219 The allowance of limited continued infringement
allows some protection for the intervenor's business interests' 2
but still permits the patentee, through the injunction, to retain con-
trol over the bulk of the patent rights." The patentee has full
freedom to exploit these rights, by licensing the patent to others,
by practicing the patent exclusively on its own, or even by refus-
ing to license or use the patent at all. -2m Where the transaction
costs are low, and the intervenor is a more efficient producer than
the patentee, it would be expected that the injunction would be
waived and the patentee would sell a license to the infringer.'
However, several aspects of the intervening rights situation
cause it to deviate from the ideal market situation. First, since the
intervenor is only partially compensated by the payment of
unrecouped investments and conversion costs, 4 the intervenor
will still have suffered an uncompensated loss if the patentee de-
cides not to license the patent.
Further, even if the patentee is willing to license the patent, an
intervening rights situation where an injunction is available presents
some of the aspects of a bilateral monopoly.2 5 The intervenor is
219. See Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing Inc., 754 F.2d 1574, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 903 (10th
Cir. 1979); see also Moretz II, 573 F.2d 191, 192 (4th Cir. 1978) (upholding a lower
court's decree allowing an intervenor to continue infringement for a limited time, while
paying a specified royalty).
220. The intervenor's interests would seem to be equally well protected by a cash pay-
ment of the unrecouped investment or conversion costs by the patentee. This solution
would be preferred by the patentee where its losses from the continued infringement ex-
ceed the intervenor's profits, but is not authorized by § 252, which only allows for con-
tinued infringement. Such an option, even if available, would probably be rarely employed
because in practice by the time an intervening rights case is litigated, the costs have
already been recouped. See, e.g., Plastic Container, 607 F.2d at 903.
221. See id. at 902; Sondra, 434 F. Supp. 1340, 1363 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (allowing unlim-
ited continued infringement would "effectively extinguish the rights of the patentee"),
aff d, 579 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1978).
222. See, e.g., Cataphote Corp. v. De Soto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 774
(9th Cir. 1971).
223. See SCHICHER, supra note 124, § 9.03[l].
224. Some of the value of the intervenor's business in the infringing activity are not
compensated for, such as the value of the goodwill of the intervenor's customers and the
expected profits of continuing the activity.
225. A bilateral monopoly occurs when, in a two-party transaction situation, "neither
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able to deal only with the patentee in regard to the patented activi-
ty. And the patentee, while able to deal with others, will have a
large incentive to deal with the intervenor since the latter has al-
ready committed resources to the patented activity, and therefore
will have both the incentive and ability to offer better terms to the
patentee than other potential licensees. Since the range of the pos-
sible prices benefitting both sides is large, larger-than-normal trans-
action costs are expected. 6
2. A Right to Royalty-Free Future Infringement
Another approach would be to grant the infringer a non-trans-
ferable, royalty-free license for the life of the patent. 7 However,
this approach is also not without its problems. To the extent the
license right granted the intervenor is worth more to the patentee,
the bilateral monopoly problem occurs here. The patentee can buy
the license back only from the intervenor, and the intervenor, since
the right is non-transferable, can only sell it to the patentee. This is
likely to be less of a problem here than in the injunction situation,
because the license is probably more valuable in the hands of the
intervenor than in the patentee. (The intervenor clearly had a desire
for such a license before the reissue, while the patentee has no
obvious desire for exclusive use of the patent.)
The result from allowing unconditional infringement may not
be equitable. Where the patent teaches the activity that the interve-
nor uses, it is fair for the patentee to get some compensation,
especially where the grant of a royalty-free license would severely
undermine the value of the patent.'
However, allowing continued royalty-free infringement is appro-
priate where the patentee has behaved unreasonably in obtaining
the reissue. This could occur if there is evidence that the reissue
was improper or if the patentee unreasonably delaying in seeking
reissue of a patent known to be erroneous.? 9 The concerns for
party has good alternatives to dealing with the other." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 62 (4th ed. 1992).
226. See id. at 119; see also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 874 (1990) (noting that transaction
costs in technology licensing are generally "steep," and are particularly high where licens-
es are tailored to specific licensees).
227. See, e.g., Gerhardt v. Kinnaird, 162 F. Supp. 858, 865 (E.D. Ky. 1958).
228. See Robertson, supra note 139, at 826.
229. Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, reissues were often invalidated because of delay in
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protecting the interests of the patentee are less pronounced when
the patentee has behaved unreasonably. In such cases the court
should provide a liberal remedy to the intervenor in view of the
fact that patentee has knowingly allowed the intervenor's reliance
to increase. This broad remedy is consistent with the complete
immunity given to infringers who successfully raise an equitable
estoppel defense.230 The sole case under § 252 granting royalty-
free infringement involved this sort of unreasonable behavior by
the patentee.23
3. Forced Licensing of the Patent
The concerns of granting the intervenor unlimited, royalty-free
infringement can be reduced or eliminated by requiring the interve-
nor to pay a royalty in exchange for practicing the patent. Such an
seeking a reissue. See, e.g., General Radio Co. v. Allen B. Du Mont Lab., 129 F.2d 608,
612 (3d Cir. 1942). It is far from clear that the same result would occur today. There is
some indication that a narrowing reissue would be held invalid for laches where interven-
ing rights had accrued. See Ex parte Lafferty, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 202, 203-04 (PTO Bd.
App. 1975) ('l~n the absence of equitable considerations [(intervening rights)], an applica-
tion for a narrowed reissue may not be denied on the grounds of delay or lack of dili-
gence in filing the reissue application."); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Roberts Chems., Inc., 245
F.2d 693, 698 (4th Cir. 1957) (holding a reissue valid after a nine-year delay in filing
but noting that "a serious question would be presented if it were shown that intervening
rights had accrued during the long interval"). But see Principle Bus. Enters. v. United
States, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 180, 183-84 (Cl. Ct. 1985) (holding that the doctrine of
laches can invalidate a narrowing reissue without a showing of prejudice). However, the
discussions of intervening rights in these cases seems to be based on the old view of
intervening rights as of a general, rather than personal nature. See Brown, supra note 217,
at 335 (drawing a distinction between "an intervening right," which is "in the nature of a
personal license, based purely on equitable estoppel" and "intervening rights," which are
not rights at all, but "facts or conditions" that would invalidate the reissue). Intervening
rights under 35 U.S.C. § 252 are personal. See White v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 263 F.
Supp. 788, 810 (D. Conn. 1966), affd, 389 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1968).
The MPEP is cryptic regarding a diligence requirement for reissues sought less than
two years after the issuance of the patent, and altogether silent in regard to those sought
later. See MPEP, supra note 40, § 1403 ("When a reissue application is filed within 2
years from the date of the original patent, a rejection on the grounds of lack of diligence
or delay in filing the reissue should not normally be made, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary:').
230. See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (in banc).
231. See Gerhardt, 162 F. Supp. at 865 ("[lIt is not an unreasonable deduction that the
[reissue] application was not so much to correct an 'error' in the original application but
to inject an item which was wholly absent in the original patent."). Ironically, intervening
rights in Gerhardt were invoked to the patentee's benefit. See id. ("If this court cannot
apply the equitable remedy [of allowing royalty-free continued infringement] it would feel
compelled to invalidate the patent on the ground of fraud ... [or] lack of invention.").
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arrangement removes the patentee's ability to secure a windfall
from its superior negotiating position by securing the protection of
the intervenor's interest in continuing its business activities. 32
Since the intervenor would have to pay a reasonable royalty to the
patentee, the arrangement will also benefit the patentee and loss of
value of the patent would be minimized3
This approach has been justly criticized when applied to patent
infringement cases.3 4 It involves the court in determining the
price for a patent license, something markets are better suited to
do 35 It also deprives the patentee of its right to refuse to license
or even refuse to use the patent.36
However unwise forced licensing is generally, it is appropriate
in intervening rights situations. In these situations, unlike in in-
fringement situations, the patentee has contributed to the
intervenor's reliance, and therefore may be said to have lost some
of the rights it would have had otherwise. There is precedent in
other intervening rights provisions for what is in essence compulso-
ry licensing. 7  Although the judicial determination of a reason-
able royalty rate is difficult, patent cases involving infringe-
ment? 9 and antitrust 4 provide a basis for making such deter-
232. See Foster v. American Mach. & Foundry, 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974)
(ordering that continued infringement be permitted, with periodic payments from infringer
to patentee of damages, after rejecting an injunction, which could be used "as a club to
be wielded by a patentee to enhance his negotiating stance").
233. See id.
234. See SCHIucHER, supra note 124, §§ 9.02(1], 9.03[2].
235. See In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F.
Supp. 1354, 1397 (N.D. I. 1993) (Easterbrook, J., sitting by designation) ('The injunction
creates a property right and leads to negotiations between the parties. A private outcome
to these negotiations-whether they end in a license at a particular royalty or in the ex-
clusion of an infringer from the market-is much preferable to a judicial guesstimate
about what a royalty should be."), affd, 71 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
236. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
237. The intervening rights provisions in 35 U.S.C. § 154(c) provide for "essentially a
compulsory license" with "little, if any, guidance . . . as to what ... equitable
remuneration" is to be awarded the patentee. Irving & Lewis, supra note 9, at 355-56.
The Veterans Patent Extension Act left to "the sound discretion of the courts" the task of
determining the reasonable royalty due the patentee in exchange for continuing infringing
activity. See S. REP. No. 81-1190, at 2 (1949), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.S. 2667, 2668.
238. See Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed.
Cit. 1988) (characterizing the task as often involving "more the talents of a conjurer than
those of a judge").
239. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) (providing that damages for infringement shall "in no
event [be] less than a reasonable royalty").
240. See ERiCH KAUFR, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 53 (1989) ("In some
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minations." Further, problems of setting a reasonable royalty
and depriving the patentee of its right to exclude others will not
arise where the patentee has already licensed others. Even in situa-
tions where the patentee has not already granted licenses, but
seems certain to do so, the price-setting problem can be addressed
by awarding the intervenor a right to license the patent at whatever
terms are provided by the patentee to other licensees. This is simi-
lar to "more favorable terms" provisions that appear in some patent
licenses.242 However, such provisions often prove troublesome
even for parties that agree to them on their own,243 and therefore
a court-imposed royalty rate may lead to fewer subsequent dis-
putes.
CONCLUSION
The goals of the intervening rights system are to avoid the
potentially chilling effect of reissues on third-party investments,
while doing as little harm as possible to the interests of patentees.
The present proposal accomplishes this by (1) requiring reasonable
reliance on the original patent as a prerequisite to a grant of equi-
table intervening rights, and (2) granting broad protection to inter-
venors in the form of a forced license when an intervenor has
shown such reasonable reliance.
The requirement of reasonable reliance separates those infring-
ers who were enticed to undertake or continue their activities be-
cause of the error in the original patent from those who were
effectively indifferent to the error. Protecting the former reduces
the chilling effect the potential of reissues would otherwise have on
investments. Not protecting the latter allows the patentee to collect
damages for infringing activities that would have occurred even if
the patent had been issued with the correct scope.
The grant of broad protection upholds the reliance of interve-
nors on the patent system. It allows them the assurance that their
legitimately commenced activities will not be cut off due to an
error not of their own making. And in providing for royalty pay-
125 antitrust proceedings, tens of thousands of U.S. patents have been subjected to licens-
ig, usually at 'reasonable' royalty rates.!).
241. See 4 CISUM, supra note 14, § 20.03[3] (surveying the case law on determination
of a reasonable royalty in infringement cases).
242. See JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY § 9.01 (1994).
243. See id.
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ments to the patentee, the forced license approach protects the
interest of the patentee in receiving the value of the invention. By
satisfying the interests of both patentees and the public, this solu-
tion meets the goals of the patent system--encouraging innovation
by rewarding invention, and dissemination of reliable information
to the public.
JONATHAN A. PLATr
